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Abstract: This study explored the influence of personal values on destructive leader behavior. Student 
participants completed a managerial assessment center that presented them with ambiguous leadership 
decisions and problems. Destructive behavior was defined as harming organizational members or striving 
for short-term gains over long-term organizational goals. Results revealed that individuals with self-
enhancement values were more destructive than individuals with self-transcendence values were, with the 
core values of power (self-enhancement) and universalism (self-transcendence) being most influential. 
Results also showed that individuals defined and structured leadership problems in a manner that reflected 
their value systems, which in turn affected the problem solutions they generated. 
Keywords: personal values, beliefs, destructive leadership, ethical decision making 
 
Introduction 
Leadership occurs in ill-defined and ambiguous situations (Mumford and Connelly, 1991). For this 
reason, the potential for leaders to make destructive decisions or follow a destructive course of action is 
always present. Although destructive or unethical leadership has received a fair amount of theoretical 
attention (e.g., Bass, 1998; Brown and Trevino, 2006a; Burns, 1978; Sims, 1994), authors have observed 
that a clear understanding and adequate empirical research in this area are still missing (e.g., Padilla et al., 
2007; Schminke et al., 2005). Responding to this inadequacy, researchers have recently directed attention 
towards identifying the personal characteristics underlying the motivation to be destructive (e.g., Bass and 
Steidlmeier, 1999; Hogan and Hogan, 2001). A common theme throughout this research is that 
destructive or unethical leaders seem to pursue short-term self-interests to the detriment of long-term, 
shared organizational goals (e.g., Conger, 1990; Darley, 2001; House and Howell, 1992; O’Connor et al., 
1995). 
The purpose of the present study was to explore further the relationship between the pursuit of self-
interests and the motivation to be destructive. Specifically, we explored the role personal values play in 
destructive leader decision making and problem solving. Using the values theory proposed by Schwartz 
and colleagues (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, 1990), we predicted that individuals 
with self-enhancement values would be more destructive when constructing and ultimately solving ethical 
problems than would those with self-transcendence values when placed in ambiguous leadership 
situations. Discussion of personal values in general has been fairly common in the leadership literature 
(e.g., Burns, 1978; Chan and Drasgow, 2001; Fairholm, 1998; House and Shamir, 1993; Lord and Brown, 
2001; Michie and Gooty, 2005; Mitchell, 1993; Sosik, 2005), and they have specifically been connected 
to unethical behavior (e.g., Grojean et al., 2004; Hunt, 1991; O¢Connor et al., 1995; Sims, 1994). 
However, little empirical research has explored how values influence a leader’s destructive or unethical 
decision making using an established, validated theory of human values, making it difficult to establish a 
clear theoretical framework in this area. 
Destructive leadership 
Organizational leadership can be viewed as social, goal-oriented problem solving and decision making 
(Fleishman et al., 1991; Mumford et al., 2000). By definition, leadership occurs in situations that require 
interpretation and structure, which heightens the influence of personal attributes such as beliefs and 
values (Hunt, 1991; Mumford et al., 1993b). A leader’s choices in these complex decision environments 
can mean the difference between an organization following a constructive or a destructive path. Jones 
(1991) defined an unethical choice as one that is illegal or is viewed as immoral by society. Similarly, 
O’Connor et al. (1995) defined a destructive leader as an individual whose decisions “clearly harmed his 
or her society or organization” (p. 536). It is not easy to know in advance which leaders are going to make 
destructive choices. In addition, because destructive decisions are not necessarily illegal, leaders who 
make those decisions may not believe, let alone admit, that they behaved destructively (Anand et al., 
2004; Messick and Bazerman, 2001). 
Rest (1986) proposed that ethical decision making or problem solving consists of recognizing the 
presence of a moral issue, making a moral judgment, placing importance on moral behavior, and acting in 
accordance with one’s moral intent. Similarly, Trevino and colleagues (Trevino 1986, 1992; Trevino et 
al., 2006) suggest that ethical decision making involves the encounter of an ethical situation, the moral 
development of the decision maker, and various individual and situation factors such as locus of control 
and organizational climate. Central in these theories and present in most ethical decision- making theories 
and discussions is the idea that there is some internal standard (influenced by many personal 
characteristics such as locus of control and moral development) that plays a predominant role in the 
willingness to follow a destructive course of action (e.g., Bommer et al., 1987; Forsyth and Nye, 1990; 
Hegartey and Sims, 1978; Reynolds, 2006). This internal standard is present in some form throughout the 
stages of responding to an ethical situation, from recognizing one is facing a problem containing a moral 
dilemma to ultimately responding to that problem. 
The process of responding to a problem with ethical content typically begins with recognizing that one is 
facing an ethical dilemma (Trevino et al., 2006). Once recognized, individuals are thought to make a 
moral judgment about the dilemma using a fairly rational, moral reasoning process (Monin et al., 2007; 
Trevino et al., 2006). Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984) theory of moral development has been referenced most 
often to explain this reasoning approach. Based on Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, Kohlberg 
hypothesized that moral reasoning is guided by an individual’s level of moral development, with three 
main stages of moral development proposed (each with two levels): preconventional, conventional, and 
postconventional. In the preconventional stage, an individual assesses a moral or ethical dilemma based 
on a motivation to obey and avoid punishment. In the conventional stage, an individual considers what 
society would view as right and wrong – looking to others for information. Finally, in the 
postconventional stage, moral reasoning is based on personal principles concerning justice, considering 
what one believes to be right and wrong. According to Trevino et al. (2006), moral awareness and moral 
reasoning set the stage for ethical behavior, and although the ethical problem solving will be influenced 
by these initial processes, it will not be governed completely by them. In addition, Trevino et al. argued 
that individuals would not always engage in moral reasoning before responding in an ethical situation. 
Addressing ethical leadership specifically, Brown and Trevino (2006a) argued that several individual 
differences and situational factors will influence how a leader will ultimately responds to a decision or 
problem containing an ethical dilemma. Based on past ethical decision-making research, they proposed a 
model of ethical leadership composed of two main predictor categories, individual factors and situational 
factors. When a leader is faced with a problem or decision that contains an ethical dilemma, these factors 
(such as personality, moral development, and the ethical context) likely play important roles from initial 
awareness of the ethical dilemma, to moral reasoning and judgment, to the final motivation to pursue an 
ethical or destructive course of action. Overall, one individual difference that has been discussed often in 
various forms as an important predictor of destructive leader behavior is the motivation to pursue short-
term, self-interests over long-term, organizational interests (e.g., Darley, 2001; House and Howell, 1992). 
Pursuing personal versus collective interests 
Hamilton and Sanders (1999) argued that destructive corporate outcomes are usually traceable to a 
leadership decision that reflected short-term personal goals. The motivation or willingness to place self-
interests ahead of shared organizational goals has been discussed throughout the leadership literature as 
potentially leading to destructive behavior (e.g., Conger, 1990; Hogan et al., 1990; House and Howell, 
1992; Howell, 1988; Howell and Avolio, 1992). Most notably, both the transformational and charismatic 
theorists have argued that leaders who are motivated by internal, opportunistic motives have a higher 
probability of being destructive. In the charismatic leadership theory these leaders have been labeled as 
“personalized” and in the transformational theory they have been labeled as “inauthentic” (see Howell, 
1988; Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999, respectively).  
Personalized and inauthentic leaders have a tendency to use their power and influence for personal 
advantage. Socialized and authentic leaders, on the other hand, are other-oriented and work to empower 
followers in an effort to achieve collective goals (Howell and Shamir, 2005; Luthans and Avolio, 2003). 
Although both types of leaders can be successful (see Howell, 1988; Avolio and Locke, 2002), socialized 
and authentic leaders will tend to be more ethical due to their desire to treat others fairly and respectfully. 
Both charismatic and transformational theorists reference internal standards composed of values and 
beliefs when differentiating between personalized/inauthentic and socialized/ authentic leaders (e.g., 
Avolio and Bass, 1995; Bass, 1998; Ehrhart, and Klein, 2001; Howell and Shamir, 2005; Jung and 
Aviolio, 2000; Kuhnert and Lewis, 1987). House (1977) and House and Shamir (1993), for example, 
argued that charismatic leaders are able to motivate and inspire followers by drawing a connection 
between their own values and those of their followers. Leaders who value actions that transcend personal 
self-interests are likely to create organizational environments where destructive activity is not tolerated. 
Though not referenced directly in the Brown and Trevino (2006a) ethical leadership model, research and 
theory on charismatic and transformational leadership indicate that personal value differences are a key 
determinant behind a leader’s motivation to pursue self-interests. In fact, personal values in general have 
been cited and/or found in past research to be important predictors of ethical behavior (e.g., Finegan, 
1994; Fritzsche, 1995; Schmidt and Posner, 1982). However, the exact role values play in the ethical 
decision-making process is still unclear, as little research has explored their effect using an establish 
theory of the structure and content of personal value systems. 
Personal values 
Rokeach (1973) defined a value as “an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state is 
personally or socially preferable relative to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state” (p. 5). 
Values are stable, individual characteristics (Braithwaite and Scott, 1991; Meglino et al., 1989; Rokeach, 
1973; Schwartz, 1992) that serve as behavioral guides, influencing both the choices people make 
(Epstein, 1989; Rohan, 2000) and the problem solutions they generate (Brophy, 1998). The value systems 
of all individuals can be described using the same finite set of core values; people differ only in the 
importance placed on each value (Rokeach, 1973). Thus, depending on how their values are hierarchically 
structured, leaders could easily differ on whether or not they view, consciously or not, a destructive 
behavior as attractive. 
Unlike attitudes, values reflect the desirable and not specifically what is desired (Kluckhohn, 1951). They 
are cross-situational guides that often influence behavior beyond one’s level of awareness. Similar to 
attitudes, however, before values will influence behavior, they must be activated (Williams, 1979). This 
activation can come from inside an individual or from the environment. Based on each individual’s value 
structure, certain situations will activate certain values and more powerful values will be activated more 
easily, causing them to be more influential (Staub, 1989). Values exert internal pressure on individuals to 
behave in a certain way (Rokeach, 1973), and although individuals can choose to behave in a manner 
inconsistent with their values, they will, over time, develop predictable behavioral preferences that are 
reflective of their hierarchical value system. 
Expanding on the work of Rokeach et al. (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, 1990; 
Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004) have developed a promising comprehensive values theory that addresses 
both the content and structure of value systems. They propose a value structure that incorporates 10 value 
types (each composed of several individual core values): (a) self-direction, (b) stimulation, (c) hedonism, 
(d) achievement, (e) power, (f) security, (g) conformity, (h) tradition, (i) benevolence, and (j) 
universalism (Schwartz, 1992). The 10 value types are organized in a circumplex structure depicting the 
motivational continuum that exists among them. Following this logic, values falling next to each other in 
this structure are viewed as compatible (e.g., power and achievement), and values lying across from each 
other are viewed as competing (e.g., power and universalism). Empirical data from numerous countries 
have supported this value structure (see Schwartz 1992; Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004). 
Schwartz (1992, 1994) suggested that for descriptive purposes, the 10 value types could be further 
structured into four higher-order dimensions: (a) openness to change (self-direction and stimulation), (b) 
conservatism (tradition, conformity, and security), (c) self-enhancement (achievement and power), and 
(d) self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence). Hedonism was hypothesized to fall somewhere 
between self-enhancement and openness. In addition, these four dimensions can be conceptualized as two 
general motivational continua: openness to change and conservatism form the poles of one continuum and 
self-transcendence and self-enhancement form the poles of the other. An individual’s position on each 
continuum is determined by the hierarchical importance that she/he assigns to the individual values 
comprising the continua. Although the above value dimensions were suggested, Schwartz and Boehnke 
(2004) emphasized that the 10 value types form a motivational continuum and aggregation of values into 
higher-order dimensions should be based on individual study predictions/ purposes, and these aggregated 
dimensions should not be viewed as separate constructs with distinct boundaries. 
Values and ethical leader behavior 
There is not a ‘‘destructiveness’’ value that predisposes a leader to engage in destructive behavior when 
faced with a problem containing an ethical dilemma. However, certain value structures seem to promote 
destructive activities more than others. Based on theory and research suggesting that destructive leaders 
are motivated by self-interests, it seems likely that self-enhancement values will be positively related to 
destructive behavior and self-transcendence values will be negatively related to destructive behavior. 
Indirect evidence for this proposition could be found in two studies conducted by Mumford et al. (1993a, 
2003). 
Mumford et al. (1993a) explored destructive beliefs and motives as predictors of destructive leader 
behaviors. Undergraduate participants in this study completed a managerial in-basket exercise that 
required them to choose among decision alternatives, some of which were destructive. Based on earlier 
research (Mumford et al., 1992), Mumford et al. (1993a) defined destructive individuals as those scoring 
high on a composite measure composed of three belief-based constructs: (a) power motives, (b) myth 
viability (having a destructive image of the word), and (c) object beliefs (the belief that one can use others 
for personal gain). Results revealed that individuals scoring high on this composite made more destructive 
organizational decisions (hurting long-term goals or profitability) and interpersonal decisions (harming 
organizational members) when they had the support of an authority figure or if they had low self-efficacy. 
Although beliefs and not values were measured in this study, beliefs lay the groundwork for personal 
value systems (Rokeach, 1973), and the three destructive belief constructs measured by Mumford et al. 
(1993a) are reflected in the Schwartz (1992) self-enhancement value dimension. 
In a related but more recent study exploring managerial integrity, Mumford et al. (2003) again had 
undergraduate students complete the managerial in-basket exercise assessing destructive organizational 
and interpersonal decision making. In this study, participants’ general beliefs and values were measured 
using several indirect assessments (participants’ scores on 21 values and 12 beliefs were inferred from 
choices they made in ambiguous decision situations). Results showed that participants with values and 
beliefs associated with personal gain, such as status (value) and material need (belief), made more 
destructive organizational and interpersonal decisions than participants with values and beliefs associated 
with a concern for others, such as human rights (value) and fairness (belief). In addition, regression 
analyses revealed that personal values accounted for approximately 20% of the variability in 
organizational and interpersonal destructive decision making. 
The present study will test if self-enhancement and self-transcendence values as defined using the 
Schwartz value theory will predict destructive leader behavior beyond the more specific destructive 
beliefs and motives constructs used in the Mumford et al. (1993a) study. In addition to using an 
established values theory, this study will also explore the effects of values and beliefs using a more ill-
defined, open-ended problem-solving task in addition to the two-option, forced-choice decision items 
used by Mumford et al. (1993a; 2003). An open-ended problem is believed to be a better representation of 
what would be encountered by an organizational leader. 
Hypothesis 1a: Individuals with self-enhancement values will make more destructive 
decisions and generate more destructive problem solutions than will those with self-
transcendence values. 
Hypothesis 1b: Self-enhancement and self-transcendence values will predict variability 
in destructive decision making and problem solving beyond what is predicted by 
destructive beliefs and motives. 
 
Values and problem construction 
The ambiguous situations in which organizational leaders work requires a high degree of interpretation. 
When encountering a problem in one of these situations, a leader must first define and construct the 
problem before directing and/or engaging in solution generation and implementation (Reiter-Palmon and 
Illies, 2004). Problem construction is a critical initial stage of ill-defined problem solving where the 
problem solver interprets and structures a problem, identifying the opportunities, objectives, and 
restrictions associate with solving it (Mumford et al., 1994; Runco and Chand, 1994). Isenberg (1991), for 
example, observed that successful managers are able to redefine and represent problems in more realistic 
and practical ways, which allow them to produce better solutions. Although problem construction is often 
skipped or completed too quickly due to it being an effortful and time-consuming activity (Reiter-Palmon 
and Illies, 2004), research has shown that problem construction is important and can enhance effective 
problem solving when completed adequately (e.g., Chand and Runco, 1992; Fontenot, 1992; Mumford et 
al., 1996; Okuda et al., 1991; Redmond et al., 1993; Reiter- Palmon et al., 1997; Rostan, 1994). 
During problem construction, attended cues from a problem situation activate alternative problem 
representations from memory (Mumford et al., 1994). As a problem becomes more complex and 
ambiguous, it will present more cues that will, in turn, activate more problem representations (Mumford 
et al., 1994). These representations are developed throughout a person’s life and reflect past experiences 
and dispositional characteristics, including beliefs and values. Hamilton and Sanders (1999) argued that 
there is a congruence between an individual’s predisposition and how one views a situation. Similarly, 
Maclagan (1998) noted specifically that values will influence how a problem environment is perceived, 
and empirically, Reiter-Palmon et al. (1998) demonstrated that values do play a role in the problem-
construction process. 
Theory and research has traditionally taken the perspective that ethical decision making and problem 
solving is a fairly rational process. However, Monin et al. (2007) observed that attention has recently been 
devoted to the more immediate reactions individuals have to ethical dilemmas. Most ethical issues will 
produce a quick emotional reaction of some sort as these issues are moral-laden and tend to activate 
strong attitudes and opinions. This initial reaction will influence early problem-solving processes and can 
have a strong influence on moral judgment, possibly even determining the outcome of this judgment 
before any rational reasoning has occurred. Monin et al. argued that although emotional reactions will 
have a stronger influence when considering quick responses to moral violations, they will also likely play 
a role when facing a more “sophisticated” ethical problem that requires a high level of reasoning. The 
emotional effect in these situations will be much more immediate than the reasoning effect as value-laden 
and affect-laden opinions will immediately be activated, affecting how the person ultimately responds to 
the problem (Illies and Reiter-Palmon, 2004). 
Based on the above, it would appear that the reactions leaders have when first encountering a problem 
with ethical content will influence how these problems are defined and constructed. As noted earlier, an 
individual’s internal disposition will in part determine the nature of his or her initial reaction to an ethical 
problem and will influence his or her problem construction. A leader with self-enhancement values will 
likely perceive or immediately look for the potential for personal gain existing in a problem whereas a 
leader with self-transcendence values will be more likely to have the collective good of the organization 
in mind when encountering that problem. This difference is expected to manifest itself in the problem 
constructions produced to a problem with ethical content, and ultimately, in the solutions generated. Thus, 
the present study will explore the possibility that problem- construction outcomes mediate the relationship 
between personal values and destructive problem solving. 
Hypothesis 2 Individuals with self-enhancement values will develop problem constructions that reflect a 
desire for personal gain, whereas those with self-transcendence values will develop problem constructions 
that reflect a concern for others. 
In turn, the degree to which problem constructions reflect self-enhancement goals over self-transcendence 




Data were collected from 160 undergraduate students (107 females, 53 males), resulting in 80 participants 
each in the problem-construction and no problem-construction conditions. The average age of participants 
was 22.30 years (SD = 4.27), and year in college was fairly evenly distributed: 55 first-year, 38 second-
year, 32 third-year, 20 fourth-year, and 15 fifth-year or higher. Approximately half of the participants 
(53%) had at least 1 year of managerial experience. 
Procedure 
Data collection materials were incorporated within a larger managerial role-play exercise where 
participants were asked to assume the role of a leader in a midsize organization. Participants first read 
through introductory information, which included background information and general directions for 
completing the various assessment exercises. All participants were asked to assume the role of Kris 
Johnson, the District Manager of Readers Booksellers, a fictitious retail bookstore chain. The introductory 
materials included background information on the company (products, market, and recent sales 
performance) and organizational structure charts depicting Kris Johnson’s location in both the corporate 
and district hierarchies. 
The assessment measures for this study consisted of four exercises: an in-basket exercise, a problem-
solving exercise, a divergent-thinking exercise, and a questionnaire packet. The in-basket exercise, 
designed to assess destructive decision making, was a modified version of an in-basket developed and 
validated by Mumford et al. (1993a). It composed of 24 items (memos, notes, letters, and phone 
messages). Each item was followed by a short paragraph that provided more detail on the people and 
situation depicted in that item. At the end of this paragraph was a one-sentence recommendation for 
responding to that in-basket item. Participants were required to decide whether or not they agreed with the 
recommendation (yes or no), and after responding, were asked to assess their belief in the future 
effectiveness of their choice and their satisfaction with that choice (both assessed on 5-point scales). 
For the problem-solving exercise, participants were presented with an ill-defined business problem where 
they had to decide if and/or in what capacity they would do business with a (fictitious) morally 
controversial client (APL – the Association for the Protection of Liberty) who was planning a conference 
in their city. Although the problem contained several aspects, the main dilemma was between boosting 
needed short-term sales versus maintaining consistent long-term profit. After reading the problem, half of 
the participants (randomly assigned) were immediately asked to generate their solution to the problem and 
the other half received the problem-construction manipulation. Patterned after Redmond et al. (1993), the 
problem-construction manipulation consisted of asking participants to restate the problem in their own 
words and to list all the problem-related factors that, in their opinion, would be important to consider 
when developing a solution. A no-problem-construction condition was included to ensure that forcing 
participants to engage in problem construction did not alter the willingness to generate a destructive 
solution. For example, it is conceivable that during the time taken to record their problem-construction 
activities, participants might devote more thought than they would normally towards how their solution 
might affect others. Similar to the in-basket exercise, participants were also prompted to rate the likely 
effectiveness of their solution and their satisfaction with their solution.  
After recording their problem solutions, participants completed a divergent-thinking exercise, where they 
were asked to generate ideas their store could use to market books written by local authors. After 
generating these marketing ideas, participants were given a questionnaire packet. The questionnaire 
packet was placed at the end of the session to ensure that answering questions about values and beliefs 
would not alter how participants responded to the destructiveness measures. Participants were asked to 
complete the questionnaires as themselves, no longer assuming the role of Kris Johnson. The 
questionnaire packet contained the personal values measure, a demographics questionnaire, and the 
destructive motives and beliefs measure. Participants were not allowed to return to the problem-solving 
and decision-making exercises once they began the questionnaire packet. The entire assessment required 
approximately 1.5 hours to complete. 
Dependent measures 
Destructive decision making 
Destructive decision making was assessed using an in-basket exercise containing four decision types: (a) 
eight potentially destructive interpersonal decisions, (b) eight potentially destructive organizational 
decisions, (c) four filler interpersonal decisions with no destructive choice, and (d) four filler 
organizational decisions with no destructive choice. Interpersonal in-basket items presented decisions 
concerning the well being of coworkers, clients, and/or customers. Organizational in-basket items 
presented decisions addressing the long-term profitability and performance of the organization. The 24 
items were presented in random order. Each in-basket item was developed to match the underlying 
organizational or interpersonal issue of an item originally developed and validated by Mumford et al. 
(1993a). The organizational setting was changed for this study in an effort to place participants in an 
industry with which they would have some familiarity (a large retail bookstore chain vs. the 
electrical/lighting division of a large Fortune 500 company). A review of each modified in-basket item by 
an industrial-organizational psychology Ph.D. and two industrial-organizational psychology doctoral 
students revealed that one interpersonal item became ambiguous after translation to the new 
organizational setting (the item appeared to force a choice between a destructive interpersonal decision 
and a destructive organizational decision). This item was dropped, resulting in seven in-basket items 
assessing destructive interpersonal decision making and eight items assessing destructive organizational 
decision making. 
The average number of destructive choices a participant selected served as the final score for each 
decision type (interpersonal vs. organizational). As discussed by Mumford et al. (1993a), an average score 
across all participants of .5 for each decision type would indicate that alternatives (destructive vs. 
nondestructive) were equally attractive and that socially desirable responding was minimized. Means 
from each scale approached this level (organizational M = .42, SD = .19, and interpersonal M = .51, SD = 
.18). The two scales were moderately correlated (r = .30) and were not related to academic achievement 
(average r = .03 with the average of high school GPA and college GPA). These results were very similar 
to those found by Mumford et al. (organizational M = .35, SD = .20, interpersonal M = .45, SD = .18, 
Intercorrelation = .30, and average r = .05 with a verbal reasoning measure), providing evidence that the 
translation to a new organizational settings did not alter the psychometric properties of the two scales. 
Solution destructiveness 
Two industrial-organizational psychology doctoral students familiar with the leadership literature 
independently assessed the destructiveness of each problem solution using a 5-point scale. 
Destructiveness was defined as the degree to which the solution was unethical, immoral, harmed 
organizational members, and/or negatively affected long-term organizational goals or performance 
(Mumford et al., 1993a; Sims, 1994). Judges participated in approximately 1 hour of training before 
assigning ratings. Training included presentations and discussions of the theory and research associated 
with destructive leadership. In addition, sample solutions and in-depth discussions were used to ensure 
judges understood the definition of destructiveness, the rating scale, and the nature of the business 
problem. Before assigning ratings, judges were instructed to read through all solutions (presented in 
random order). Interrater reliability was .80 (intraclass correlation (3,2), Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). 
Examples of destructive and non-destructive solutions are presented in Table I. 
Problem-construction goals 
Two judges (also industrial-organizational psychology graduate students) rated the problem constructions 
on the degree to which they reflected self-enhancement goals (low rating) or self-transcendence goals 
(high rating). Similar to the solution ratings, judges were trained for approximately 1 hour on problem-
construction theory and research and on the Schwartz values theory and research, including in-depth 
discussions focused on the core values that comprised the self-enhancement/ self-transcendence value 
continuum and how these core values might translate into different goals when individuals are faced with 
various ill-defined problems. Similar to the solution ratings, sample problem constructions were used to 
ensure an adequate understanding. Interrater reliability was .75. Examples of problem constructions 
reflecting self-enhancement and self-transcendence goals are presented in Table II. 
Individual difference measures 
Personal values 
Personal values were measured using the 56-item Schwartz (1992) values inventory. Consistent with the 
recommendation of Schwartz and with the definition of a value, participants were asked to rate each value 
“as a guiding principle in my life” using a nine-point rating scale ranging from opposed to my values (-1) 
to of supreme importance (7). Descriptive statistics revealed that 20 out of the 56 values had scores 
ranging from )1 to 7 and none had a range of less than 5 scale points, indicating socially desirable 
responding was minimal. 
Before computing the 10 value types (power, achievement, hedonism, universalism, benevolence, 
stimulation, self-direction, tradition, conformity, and security), individual value scores were centered for 
each individual using his/her total score on all the value items to correct for individual differences in scale 
use (Schwartz et al., 1997). The 10 value types were then computed by averaging the centered scores (see 
Schwartz and Boehnke (2004) for a list of the individual values used to represent each value type). A self-
enhancement value dimension composed of power, achievement, and hedonism and a self-transcendence 
value dimension composed of benevolence and universalism were then constructed using the value-type 
scores. Finally, a transcendence-enhancement value continuum was constructed by subtracting one-
dimension pole from the other (S. H. Schwartz, personal communication, August 22, 2004). Internal 
consistency estimates for the 10 value types ranged from .55 to .79 (average = .65, see Table III). 
Although some internal consistency estimates were low to moderate by conventional standards, they are 
consistent with past research using this measure and are considered adequate given the small number of 
values used to represent each value type (see Schwartz, 1992). In addition, all individual item-total 
correlations were higher than .23, with most (87%) higher than .30. 
Destructive beliefs 
Power motives, object beliefs, and myth viability were assessed using three biodata scales developed by 
Mumford et al. (1992). These three scales were used by Mumford et al. (1993a) to assess the “propensity 
for destructive acts” and have been found to be fairly reliable and valid in a number of studies (e.g., 
Gessner et al., 1995; Mumford et al., 1993a). In the present study, the reliabilities for the power motives 
(nine items, a = .68) and object beliefs (eight items, a = .66) scales were typical of biodata measures, 
which commonly show lower internal consistency but higher test-retest reliability (Mumford and Owens, 
1987). As was the case in the Mumford et al. (1993a) study, myth viability was found to have a low 
internal consistency (six items, α = .41). For this reason, a destructive beliefs composite was computed 
using only the power motives and object beliefs scale scores. 
Demographic and control variables 
Several variables were measured to be used as control variables. Participants were asked to report their 
gender, age, college GPA, and high school GPA. A composite GPA score was computed by averaging 
high school GPA and college GPA. Participants were also asked to report the amount of managerial 
experience they have using a 5-point scale (none, less than 1 year, 1–2 years, 3–4 years, or 5 or more 
years). Finally, as indicated previously, because participants completed a problem-solving exercise, we 
measured their divergent-thinking ability by having them generate ideas for marketing books written by 




Personal values and destructive beliefs 
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for all study variables are presented in Table III. The three 
destructiveness measures produced low to moderate correlations with each other, indicating that each was 
capturing a unique aspect of destructive behavior. Supporting Hypothesis 1a, the self-enhancement value 
dimension was positively related to destructive decision making and problem solving, whereas the self-
transcendence value dimension was negatively related to these behaviors. The core value types of power 
(positive correlations) and universalism (negative correlations) produced the highest correlations across 
the three criteria. Destructive beliefs also correlated significantly and positively with the destructiveness 
measures, with objects beliefs and power motives being the most strongly related. 
The correlations among participants’ values and beliefs and their decision/solution satisfaction and 
effectiveness beliefs produced consistent trends across all three destructiveness measures. Therefore, the 
scores were combined to form an overall satisfaction score and an overall effectiveness-beliefs score. 
Power values and power motives were negatively related to satisfaction (r = -.16 and  -22, respectively, p 
< .05) and universalism values were positively related to satisfaction (r = .22, p < .05). Participants’ 
values and beliefs did not relate to their belief in the effectiveness of their chosen actions (with the one 
exception of myth viability (r = .16, p <.05), but given the low internal consistency of this measure, 
interpretation of this result would be difficult, especially considering it was the only value or belief 
significantly correlated with effectiveness beliefs). 
Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that personal values contributed independently to the prediction 
of destructive behavior for two of the three destructiveness criteria when combined with destructive 
beliefs, partially supporting Hypothesis 1b (see Table IV). The transcendence-enhancement value 
continuum and the destructive-beliefs composite scores were used for these analyses. Several variables 
were used as controls in these analyses: (a) managerial experience, (b) age, (c) gender (dummy coded), 
(d) GPA, and (e) divergent-thinking ability (controlled only when analyzing the problem solutions). The 
ability of the value continuum and the destructive-beliefs composite to predict beyond the control 
variables varied depending on the specific criterion. When predicting the destructiveness of problem 
solutions, only the values composite (β= -.17, p< .05) contributed uniquely beyond the control measures 
(ΔR2 = .06, F (2,150) = 5.05, p < .01). For destructive organizational decision making, both the value 
continuum (β= -.17, p < .05) and the beliefs composite (β = .22, p < .05) contributed uniquely beyond the 
control measures (ΔR2 = .11, F (2,151) = 10.05, p < .01). It was also found that younger participants (β= -
.19, p< .05), and women (β = -.18, p< .05, female M = .44, male M = .37) made more destructive 
organizational decisions. Finally, for destructive interpersonal decision making, only the beliefs 
composite (β = .19, p< .05) contributed uniquely beyond the control measures (ΔR2 = .06, F (2,151) = 
4.58, p < .01). No significant interactions were found between the values continuum and the beliefs 
composite. 
Problem construction 
Solution destructiveness did not differ between those who engaged in problem construction and those 
who did not (M = 2.52 and M = 2.36, respectively, t (158) = .95), confirming that forcing participants to 
engage in problem construction did not alter how destructive they were willing to be with their solution. 
The role of problem construction was then further explored using only those participants in the problem-
construction condition (n = 80). The transcendence-enhancement value continuum was positively related 
to the degree to which problem constructions reflected self-transcendence goals over self-enhancement 
goals (r = .22, p <.05), indicating that participants constructed the problem in a way that reflected their 
underlying value systems. The problem-construction scores were also correlated with solution 
destructiveness (r = -.49, p < .01) such that participants who constructed the problem in a manner that 
reflected self-transcendence goals generated solutions that were less destructive than did those who 
constructed the problem in a manner that reflected self-enhancement goals. 
Because values were related to both the problem constructions and the problem solutions in addition to 
the problem constructions being related to the problem solutions, a hierarchical regression analysis was 
run to explore if problem construction might mediate between values and destructive problem solving 
(analyses were based on Baron and Kenny (1986); however, because this study was partially 
correlational, supportive results would only provide an indication that a mediated relationship might exist 
(see Stone- Romero and Rosopa, 2004)). After entering the control variables (age, gender, GPA, 
divergent thinking, and managerial experience), the value continuum was found to be a significant 
predictor of solution destructiveness (β= -.22, t (73) = 1.88, p<.05) However, when adding the problem-
construction scores (β = -.44, t (72) = 4.25, p<.01), the value continuum was no longer a significant 
predictor (β = -.13, t (72) = 1.25, ns). The value continuum and the problem-construction scores along 
with the control variables accounted for 28% of the variance in solution destructiveness (F (7,72) = 7.72, 
p<.01).The change of the value continuum from a significant predictor alone (β = -.22) to a non-
significant predictor when combined with the problem-construction goals (β = -.13) indicates that the 




The results of this study expand on the model of ethical leadership proposed by Brown and Trevino 
(2006a) by demonstrating that personal values have a direct and potentially indirect (through problem 
construction activities) influence on ethical behavior. Participants with self-enhancement values were 
more destructive when placed in leadership situations than were those with self-transcendence values, 
with the core values of power (self-enhancement) and universalism (self-transcendence) being most 
influential. As evidenced in this study, personal values exert a powerful influence on the choices people 
make (Epstein, 1989). This influence will become stronger as the situation becomes more ambiguous, as 
is typically the case when facing ethical choices. For organizational leaders, the influence of values may 
be especially powerful, as they must make ethical decisions in fast-paced, changing environments where 
solutions paths are unclear and potential outcomes are unknown.  
An important contribution of this study to the existing literature is that it provides an empirical link 
between values and destructive leader behavior using a validated theory of personal values. The term 
“values” has arguably been overused as a label for identifying a variety of constructs or ideas in the 
organizational literature (Dose, 1997). As a result, it is difficult to describe the general relationship 
between personal values and organizational behavior. Using the Schwartz values theory, which has been 
validated in many studies across numerous countries, we demonstrated that there is a clear values  
difference between individuals who are willing to engage in destructive behavior and those who are not. 
Specifically, those willing to be destructive tend to fall towards the self-enhancement pole on the 
Schwartz (1992) circumplex value structure whereas those not willing to be destructive fall towards the 
self-transcendence pole. Although individuals may not always behave in a manner consistent with their 
values, those values will always exert an influence, consciously or not, and there appears to be a unique, 
definable value structure that predicts destructive behavior. 
This study also revealed that values have an immediate influence when individuals are facing realistic 
leadership situations. Participant’s initial problem interpretations or constructions reflected their value 
systems and ultimately had a strong influence on the type of solutions generated. By using an open-ended 
problem-solving task, we were able to assess participants’ interpretations of problems in addition to 
having a more realistic test of the effect of values on ethical leader behavior. Rather than having 
participants simply make a judgment about a smaller ethical dilemma directly, the study embedded that 
dilemma into a full problem-solving situation, requiring participants to not only make an ethical or moral 
judgment (is this right or wrong), but to provide a solution to the larger problem at hand. Thus, they were 
forced to consider more than just a single ethical dilemma. In addition, the problem-solving exercise was 
just one exercise in a larger role-play activity where participants assumed the role of a corporate leader 
and made various decisions and solved various problems pertaining to more complete picture of the 
ethical behavior process.  
The finding that values have an immediate effect on problem-construction activities supports the 
arguments of Hamilton and Sanders (1999) and Maclagan (1998) that internal characteristics color how 
individuals perceive a situation, which in turn affects how they behave in that situation. These results also 
support the more recent argument that ethical issues in particular may produce an immediate reaction that 
influences how one ultimately reasons about and responds to that issue (Monin et al., 2007). Although the 
problem used in this study was designed to motivate a reasoned response as opposed to a quick reaction, 
the initial perception of the problem influenced how the problem was defined and constructed, which in 
turn guided the rest of the problem-solving effort. These results support Monin et al.’s (2007) suggestion 
that both the immediate reaction to an ethical issue and the more delayed reasoning that accompanies 
making an ethical judgment play important roles in influencing the resultant behavior. 
The idea that problem construction may mediate between values and ethical problem solving may have 
important applications in organizational settings as the initial problem-solving stages may be a critical 
point at which to guide ethical problem solving. Engaging in problem construction requires time and 
effort (Reiter-Palmon and Illies, 2004), but if managed appropriately, could provide an opportunity for 
promoting ethical behavior by those with self-serving motives. If motivated to engage in problem 
construction and if surrounded by environments that promote ethical behavior and strongly convey the 
importance of working toward the good of the organization and its employees, leaders can be influenced 
to construct a problem in a non-destructive manner, which may prevent any initial self-serving thoughts 
stemming from self-enhancement values from translating into destructive behaviors. It was noted earlier 
that individuals will not necessarily behave in a manner consistent with their values, and research has 
shown that interventions aimed at the problem construction stage can influence the types of solutions 
generated (e.g., Redmond et al., 1993). The difficulty will be finding ways to ensure that leaders with 
self-serving tendencies are motivated to engage in problem construction and to consider the shared goals 
of the organization and its members when doing so. 
Mumford et al. (2003) found that personal values were largely redundant with beliefs when predicting 
destructive decision making and problem solving, whereas this study revealed that values were important 
predictors in addition to beliefs. There are several likely reasons for this difference. First and foremost, 
Mumford et al. used a global assessment of beliefs, whereas this study used specific measures of 
destructive beliefs. A second noteworthy difference is that Mumford et al. assessed values and beliefs by 
developing indirect measures. Although these indirect measures have several advantages and were 
constructed to reflect established theories, including the Schwartz theory, exactly how they map onto the 
Schwartz circumplex value structure is unclear. Taken as a whole, however, the present study combined 
with the Mumford et al. study and the Mumford et al. (1993a) study reveal a consistent positive 
relationship between self-serving or selfenhancement values and beliefs and destructive leader behavior. 
The suggestion that leaders with self-enhancement values may choose more destructive decision 
alternatives than those with self-transcendence values is consistent with past leadership theory suggesting 
that leaders should place more importance on the collective, long-term goals of their organizations and 
followers than on their own short-term personal interests (e.g., Conger, 1990; Darley, 2001; Howell and 
Shamir, 2005; Mitchell, 1993; Sims, 1994). Leaders determine the ethical climate of their organizations 
(Trevino et al., 2003). If they consistently model behaviors that show honest concern for others and for 
the good of the organization in general, as those with self-transcendence values are likely to do, others in 
the organization will follow, creating an organization that promotes nondestructive behavior and a work 
environment were employees feel respected and valued.  
For this study, the self-enhancement value dimension was defined as a composite of the power, 
achievement, and hedonism value types. On the surface, it appears that several of the values that predicted 
destructive leadership are characteristics that are commonly associated with effective leadership, 
specifically achievement and power. However, upon closer inspection, these results are consistent with 
extant leadership research and theory. Achievement has received limited attention in leadership research, 
possibly due to the fact that most conceptualizations of achievement focus on an individual’s need to 
succeed in some or all areas of his or her own life. Because leaders must have the ability to get people to 
work together for a common goal (Bass, 1990), strong achievement motives that reflect a desire for 
personal success and ambition may be detrimental to effective leadership. This argument is consistent  
with Spangler and House (1991), who found negative correlations between need for achievement and 
presidential success and with Illies et al. (2005) and Mumford et al. (2001) who found little to no 
relationship between achievement values (measured directly) and the quality of solutions generated to 
ambiguous business problems. In addition, Ros et al. (1999) revealed that self-enhancement values 
correlated negatively with the social aspect of work (r = -.32) and positively with the prestige aspect (r = 
.29), also indicating that valuing personal achievement may impede productive social influence.  
Unlike achievement, power (largely the need for power) has a much richer history in the leadership 
literature, having been discussed as positively relating to both effective and destructive leadership. Most 
often, this apparent contradiction is reconciled by viewing power as containing both positive or social 
aspects and negative or personal aspects (e.g., House and Howell, 1992; Tjosvold, 1985). On the social 
side, a leader uses power to further the interests of the entire organization and its employees whereas on 
the personal side, a leader uses power to satisfy personal ambitions. Expanding on this idea, McClelland 
and Boyatzis (1982) hypothesized that the characteristics of effective leaders form a syndrome composed 
of moderate to high need for power, low need for affiliation, and high activity innovation. Activity 
innovation is an unconscious motive to satisfy the need for power in a socially responsible manner. In a 
longitudinal study of leaders, McClelland and Boyatzis found that their proposed syndrome, reflecting the 
more socially directed need for power, predicted promotional rates for technical managers both 8 and 16 
years after being hired.  
The need for power associated with effective leadership, therefore, is directed at the good of the collective 
and not at individual gain, a view that was later developed into the distinction between personalized and 
socialized charismatic leadership (House and Howell, 1992; Howell, 1988;). The core values comprising 
the Schwartz power value type appear to focus more on personalized power or valuing power as personal 
control (core power values include wealth, social recognition, and authority), which is consistent with its 
placement within the self-enhancement portion of the Schwartz circumplex value structure. Therefore, the 
finding that power values were positively related to destructive leadership is consistent with past views of 
the leadership- power connection. 
Finally, the results of this study revealed that neither beliefs about the effectiveness of chosen behaviors 
nor the satisfaction with those behaviors were related to level of destructiveness. In addition, none of the 
10 value types related to participants’ effectiveness beliefs and only the power value type (negative 
relationship) and the universalism value type (positive relationship) correlated with behavior satisfaction. 
One could speculate that participants with power values may have been less satisfied because they did not 
have an opportunity to see how their decisions ultimately benefited them, whereas those with 
universalism values may have been satisfied knowing that their decisions reflected their concern for 
others. Overall, however, these results suggest that leaders who act in a manner consistent with their 
values believe in the effectiveness of those behaviors and by in large are happy with those behaviors. 
People are very adept at rationalizing destructive or unethical behavior (Bandura, 1999). Corporate 
leaders who make destructive decisions may argue and fully believe that their actions reflect the best 
interests of their organizations precisely because they behaved in a manner that is consistent with their 
internal, value-driven motivations. Unfortunately, we do not know if participants in this study would have 
maintained their feelings of satisfaction and effectiveness once the long-term outcomes of their decisions 
become known. In addition, one should keep in mind that satisfaction and effectiveness beliefs were each 
assessed using one-item measures, so results should be treated cautiously. 
Limitations and future directions 
A central limitation of this study is that only individual differences (mainly values and beliefs) of 
participants placed in leadership situations were considered. Future research needs to explore how values 
and beliefs combine or interact with environmental variables and how a leader’s beliefs and values 
influence the behaviors of one’s followers. Most models of ethical behavior note that individual 
characteristics and situational factors combine to influence ethical behavior (see Trevino et al., 2006). 
Bartlett (2003) even specifically argued that ethical behavior is a combination of individual value systems 
and organizational climate, and past research has shown that personal beliefs interact with environmental 
variables in affecting the destructive behavior of leaders (Mumford et al., 1993a). Surrounding leaders 
with ethical environments might be an effective way to limit destructive behavior in organizations even 
when those leaders have self-enhancement values, possibly by motivating the development of problem 
definitions and constructions that reflect ethical goals. Future research should explore these possibilities. 
Several authors have argued that leaders can influence the ethical behaviors of their subordinates by 
making other-oriented values salient through their visions, words, or behaviors (e.g., Grojean et al., 2004; 
Kirkpatrick and Lock, 1996; Lord and Brown, 2001; Schminke et al., 2005; Thomas, Schermerhorn, and 
Dienhart, 2004). Empirical research exploring the differential effects leaders with varying value systems 
have on their followers would be very informative. In addition, it is possible that certain combinations of 
leader and follower value systems (and likely other characteristics also) are necessary for creating ethical 
or other-oriented cultures. For example, Brown and Trevino (2006b) recently found that value congruence 
between leaders and followers may mediate the relationship between leadership and deviant behavior 
such that employees with a socialized charismatic leader perceived more value congruence with their 
leader, which resulted in less deviant interpersonal behavior at work. 
Future theory and research will also benefit from a more in-depth analysis of the relationship among 
needs, beliefs, and values and their influence on destructive leadership and ethical behavior in general. 
Needs are typically defined as physiological forces motivating us to reduce an internal disequilibrium 
(Murray, 1938). Up to an extent, values and beliefs are expressions of needs. However, beliefs and values 
are cognitive in nature and their development is affected by numerous social and personal factors. Beliefs 
are thought to be more general than values, representing individual propositions or assumptions about life 
in general, capable of being true or false, good or bad, or desirable or undesirable (Rokeach, 1968). 
Values, on the other hand, are comprised of those beliefs dealing with desirable or undesirable behaviors 
or end states (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Rokeach (1973) argued that we have 1000s of beliefs, but 
only dozens of values, making beliefs somewhat more difficult to measure and research. More empirical 
work is needed to determine how values, beliefs, and needs affect destructive behavior individually and in 
combination (some research in this area is beginning to appear, such as Mumford et al., 2003). 
The present study revealed that personal values appear to influence problem solving almost immediately 
by coloring how problems are perceived and constructed. This finding is consistent with a more recent 
line of ethics research mentioned earlier showing that the immediate emotional reactions individuals have 
to ethical dilemmas have a strong influence on ethical judgments (see Monin et al., 2007). Continuation 
and expansion of these lines of research are important. In addition to considering predictors such as 
emotions and values, research should continue to explore problem construction and other cognitive 
processes potentially important to ethical problem solving and decision making, such as information 
search and encoding. The potential mediating effect of problem construction between values and 
destructive problem solving also needs further exploration. Illies and Reiter-Palmon (2004) revealed that 
problems that activate powerful values in participants could have a closed-minded effect, decreasing the 
quality of solutions generated to those problems. However, we still do not know exactly why, how, or 
where this effect occurs and if it plays a specific role in destructive problem solving. Individuals may 
unknowingly only search for and encode information that is consistent with their values or/and they may 
consciously discount any information that is contrary to their values, which may promote destructive 
behavior in that those with self-enhancement values are less likely to consider how their actions affect 
other people. By learning more about problem construction and other problem-solving processes that may 
play a role in ethical problem solving, we can discover interventions that can be used to promote non-
destructive leader behavior. 
Finally, a few limitations resulted from the use of a laboratory study. Most obviously, participants in a 
laboratory study have different motivations so may respond differently than individuals in actual business 
settings. In addition, because by necessity the individual difference questionnaires were always 
administered after the role-play exercise, fatigue and potential order effects cannot be ruled out. Finally, 
although results for several measures (notably the values and destructive decision-making measures) 
indicated that socially desirable responding was minimal, its influence on this study cannot be ruled out, 
particularly given the research topic was ethical behavior. However, despite those limitations, we believe 
that the results of this study add meaningfully to the ethical leadership literature. Laboratory studies in 
general do not produce results that are different from field studies (Campbell, 1986), and they are 
considered critically important for discovering important new relationships among leadership variables 
(Brown and Lord, 1999). In addition, we believe that the nature of the questions explored in this study 
were best answered using a laboratory method as it allowed for the manipulation of problem construction 
and for a controlled exploration of the effect of personal values on destructive decision making and 
problem solving. 
Although internal validity carries increased weight in a laboratory study, there is reason to believe the 
results of this study will generalize. The experimental task in this study was an assessment center/in-
basket exercise containing realistic decision scenarios, which is believed to be a successful method of 
studying ethical behavior in laboratory settings (Darley, 1999). In addition, and more importantly, the 
effect of values on ethical decision making is unlikely to differ meaningfully based on the sample used. 
Not only are college students only a few years away from being employees, but also because personal 
values represent cross-situation behavioral guides, the general tendency for individuals with self-
enhancement values to prefer decisions and solutions that reflect personal gain and those with self-
transcendence values to prefer behaviors that show a concern for the collective good will exist within the 
lab or the field. The degree to which a leader’s value-based preferences manifest themselves in behaviors 
may vary from situation to situation, but his or her value system is unlikely to change significantly, and 
he or she will continue to feel pressure to behave in a manner consistent with that system. 
 
Conclusions 
Understanding the destructive behavior of organizational leaders is critically important in today’s 
complex, global business world. One only needs to glance at current newspapers to see the devastating 
effects unethical leader behavior can have within corporations in addition to the effect that behavior can 
have on shareholders, consumers, and in some cases, society in general. The goal for organizations is to 
identify in advance which leaders are likely to be destructive and which environments will be the most 
conducive to destructive behavior and then neutralizing those threats. Although not yet receiving 
significant research attention, several authors have argued that assessing the values of prospective 
corporate leaders may be an effective way to decrease unethical behavior (e.g., Egri and Herman, 2000; 
Fairholm, 1998; Hogan and Hogan, 2001). The present study provided some support for that argument by 
demonstrating that certain value systems are related to destructive behavior. In addition, by demonstrated 
that individuals will tend to construct problems in a manner consistent with their values, results of this 
study also suggested that even if leaders with self-enhancement values are in place, it may be possible to 
reduce their threat by attempting to guide their problem-construction activities when they are faced with a 
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